Lesson 6 of 7

Disruption, platforms and aggregators

Step 3 of 6

Worked example

Netflix vs cable TV. Figures from the 10-Ks, checked 20 Nov 2026 against the SEC's XBRL data. Calendar years, $ in billions.

Year Netflix revenue Charter video revenue
2021 29.70 17.63
2022 31.62 17.46
2023 33.72 16.35
2024 39.00 15.13
2025 45.18 13.70
Netflix, 2021 → 2025:          45.18 ÷ 29.70 − 1 = +52.1%
Charter video, 2021 → 2025:    13.70 ÷ 17.63 − 1 = −22.3%
Netflix operating margin 2025: 13.33 ÷ 45.18     = 29.5%  (2021: 20.9%)

Charter's 2025 10-K adds: "Residential video customers decreased by 255,000 in 2025". It lists Netflix by name among its competitors, next to YouTube TV, Disney+ and free video like YouTube.

The disruption test. The Christensen Institute uses Netflix vs Blockbuster as a case: in 2000, small and loss-making, Netflix offered itself to Blockbuster for $50 million and Blockbuster passed. That's the "bottom of the market, ignored by the incumbent" pattern.

The aggregation test. Thompson's 2015 essay: TV networks used to control when shows aired; Netflix made "its entire library available at any time in any order", and owning the customer lets it spend more on content, which wins more subscribers. Netflix's rising margin fits that story; it doesn't prove it.

Where the data is weak.

  • Netflix no longer reports subscribers. Its 2025 10-K says it "discontinued the reporting of membership numbers" during 2025, "focusing instead on revenue and operating margin". The last full count was 301.6 million paid memberships at the end of 2024. Use revenue and margin.
  • Charter's lost customers went to many places, not only Netflix. No filing tells you how many.
  • One cable company isn't the whole industry. It's a test case, not a census.